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How Does Dipping into Your Pension 
Affect Your Retirement Wealth? 
 
Introduction  
Although pensions, both public and private, are intended to 
provide income during retirement, a growing number of 
American workers receive part or all their employer-provided 
pensions in the form of a cash settlement, called a lump-sum 
distribution, when they change jobs. They have many choices of 
what to do with that money: for example, they can roll it over 
into an Individual Retirement Account (IRA), spend the money 
or pay off debt, transfer it to the pension plan of a new employer, 
or even leave the money with the old employer’s pension plan. 
Policymakers are concerned that workers who spend their 
pension distributions on current consumption are depriving 
themselves of the financial resources they will need for 
retirement. 
This policy brief describes some results from an ongoing study 
on the long-term economic consequences of lump-sum pension 
distributions.1 The study uses detailed information on 
employment histories, pensions, and wealth from Wave 1 (1992) 
of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a nationally 
representative survey of individuals between the ages of 51 and 
61. 
The primary finding is that overall there is little evidence that 
dipping into pension funds significantly decreases retirement 
wealth, because workers typically consume pension distributions 
of relatively small value while preserving large pension 
accumulations for retirement. If pension assets that were spent 
had been preserved for retirement instead, they would have 
represented only about 10 percent of retirement wealth for the 
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typical household that spent the money. There is, however, a 
small group of households who would have benefited greatly if 
they had preserved all their pensions. About 2 percent of all 
households aged 51 to 61 in 1992 could have increased their 
retirement wealth by at least 25 percent if they had not dipped 
into their pensions. 
Background 
Retirement requires individuals to have accumulated 
assets to maintain consumption..., income, whether in 
the form of state-provided retirement or disability 
benefits, private pensions, income from other family 
members, or assets. (Costa 1998, pp. 14, 32) 
The concept of retirement as a complete, voluntary withdrawal 
from the paid labor force is relatively new in this country. Until 
well into the nineteenth century, the United States was primarily 
a rural, agricultural economy, where family members worked in 
and for the family according to their ability—age and health—
throughout their lifetime. Because families derived no benefit 
from deliberately idling one of their members, there was virtually 
no “unemployment,” and “retirement” was the result of disability, 
not choice, among all but the wealthy. As recently as 1880, 
nearly 80 percent of men aged 65 and older were gainfully 
employed; that is, they claimed to have had an occupation in the 
year before the census was taken. By 1990, the proportion of 
employed and retirees among older men had flipped: more than 
80 percent of men aged 65 and older were retired from the paid 
labor force. (For more information about the historical events that 
shaped retirement in twentieth century America, see Costa 1998 
and Sass 1997.) 
Today, most Americans rely on what has commonly been 
described as a “three-legged stool”—Social Security, private 
pensions, and personal savings—to provide retirement income. 
This policy brief uses the broader concept of wealth, the total 
accumulation of assets, to measure a household’s retirement 
resources.2 
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Pensions 
About half of all private-sector workers participate in a 
retirement plan, or pension (US DOL 1999). This policy brief 
focuses on the most important type of private pensions, those 
provided by firms as a benefit of employment. There are two 
types of employer-provided pensions. 
The traditional defined benefit (DB) pension dominated the first 
three-quarters of the twentieth century. With this type of pension, 
benefits are based on a formula that usually involves some 
combination of final salary, age, and years of service. DB 
pensions were designed in part to encourage a stable, dependable, 
immobile workforce that stayed with one employer for a lifetime. 
Employees do not contribute to DB plans and, in the past, most 
DB plans did not allow employees access to pension funds upon 
job change. Federal law now permits these plans to cash out 
pension benefits upon job change (or plan termination) if the 
benefit amount is less than $5,000.3 
Defined contribution (DC) pension plans have grown in 
popularity in the last few decades, as the work environment has 
moved away from long-term commitments between employer 
and employee. With this type of pension, assets accumulate in 
individual accounts through contributions by the employer and/or 
employee, as well as through interest earnings. Almost all 
defined contribution plans allow workers to access their pension 
funds upon job change. New federal legislation enables workers 
to carry their pensions with them from job to job in many cases. 
In 1975, 68 percent of all pension plan participants were enrolled 
in only a DB plan, 13 percent were in only a DC plan, and 19 
percent were in both types of plans. By 1996, those figures were 
19 percent, 50 percent, and 31 percent respectively (US DOL 
1999). 
The 401(k) plan is a defined contribution plan funded primarily 
by voluntary employee contributions. These were first authorized 
in 1978 but came into popular use after the IRS issued clarifying 
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regulations in 1981. Today, 401(k)s are the most common DC 
plan, covering over 30 percent of all private wage and salary 
workers, and about 65 percent of all pension covered workers 
(US DOL 1999). 
The federal tax code discourages cash pension settlements before 
retirement or disability in several ways. First, pensions enjoy the 
benefits of tax deferral. Pension contributions of both employees 
and employers are tax-deductible and accrue at the pre-tax 
interest rate. As contributions and interest accumulate, they are 
not taxed until withdrawal. A worker with access to pension 
benefits upon job change who rolls them over into a tax-qualified 
plan preserves the tax-favored status of the money. Otherwise, it 
is taxed as ordinary income in the year of receipt. Those who 
spend their pensions thus forego the benefits of tax deferral. In 
addition, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 established a 10 percent 
penalty excise tax on distributions to workers under age 55 that 
are not rolled into a tax-qualified plan.  
The Health and Retirement Survey 
Despite incentives to preserve pension assets until retirement, 
many workers dip into their pensions. To determine the effect of 
such behavior on retirement resources, I have assembled data 
from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The HRS is a 
nationally representative survey of individuals between the ages 
of 51 and 61. It was first conducted in 1992. A total of 12,652 
individuals who comprised 7,607 households were interviewed 
that year. These individuals have been re-interviewed every two 
years since. Each series of interviews provides detailed 
information on employment, income, wealth, health, and 
pensions. 
As a data source, the HRS has a number of advantages. First, it 
contains detailed data on household financial and housing wealth. 
Second, the study obtained detailed information from respondents 
about private pensions on current and past jobs. Third, 
respondents were asked permission to link their survey responses 
to administrative earnings histories and benefits records from the 
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Social Security Administration (SSA). With detailed information 
on financial, housing, pension, and Social Security wealth, the 
HRS is the only household survey to give complete coverage of 
the household portfolio. Finally, the survey was well timed. In 
1992, the main respondents were centered around that critical age 
of 55, after which the law permits pension cashouts without 
penalty.  
The primary disadvantage is that the HRS only interviewed 
individuals between the ages of 51 and 61 in the initial interview 
year 1992. This means that the people in this study were born 
between 1931 and 1941. This is an important group of 
Americans, but they are by no means representative of today’s 
American workers. The HRS respondents look more like old-
style workers. They are more likely to have worked in 
manufacturing, to be unionized, and to be covered by defined 
benefit plans than today’s workers. Therefore, conclusions drawn 
from this group of workers may not apply to other workers. In 
particular, younger workers are more likely to have defined 
contribution pension plans and, hence, greater access to pension 
assets upon job change than the HRS workers did. This is 
discussed in more detail in the conclusion. 
In the 1992 interview, on which this analysis is based, 
respondents were asked retrospective questions about what 
happened to pension assets for each important job they had at any 
point during their lifetime. A sample of 1,282 households was 
drawn; in each of them, a respondent reported both that they had 
left a job and had, at least once, received a lump-sum distribution 
when they left a job. 
What Do Workers Do with Lump-Sum 
Distributions? 
Table 1 shows the disposition and size of lump-sum pension 
distributions for this sample. Column 1, panel A, shows the 
percent of all recipients by disposition. Most recipients cashed 
out upon job termination. Only 26.7 percent of distributions were 
rolled into an IRA or left to accumulate in the employer’s plan. 
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TABLE 1.  Disposition and Size of Lump-Sum Distributions 
(1) (2) (3) 
Disposition 
Recipients 
(percent) 
Mean [Median] 
Distribution 
( in 1992 dollars) 
Distribution 
(percent) 
A.  Individual Uses    
Rolled over into another tax-
qualified plan or left to 
accumulate 
26.67 59,136 
[16,584] 
52.79 
Transferred to new employer’s 
plana 
0.61 66,888 
[28,094] 
1.36 
Converted to an annuitya 0.67 39,997 
[38,152] 
0.90 
Cashed out: 67.63 17,753 
[8,920] 
40.19 
     Spent 33.62 16,931 
[8,220] 
19.05 
     Saved or invested 15.21 25,928 
[13,762] 
13.20 
     Paid bills or debts 8.57 12,509 
[7,725] 
3.59 
     Other 10.24 12,702 
[6,106] 
4.35 
Other 4.42 32,421 
[23,213] 
4.76 
Total 100.00 29,880 
[11,081] 
100.00 
B.  Type of Rollover    
Tax-Qualified 27.95 58,843 
[17,458] 
55.05 
Wealth-Preserving 51.72 41,491 
[13,429] 
71.83 
Note: All figures in the table were calculated using the HRS household analysis 
weights based on the sample of 1,282 households described in the text. When 
weighted, this sample represented 2,713,816 aggregate households. See glossary 
for definitions of terms. 
aThis category was not listed as a possible response on the questionnaire for those 
with non-DC plans. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
A total of 67.6 percent of distributions were received as a cash 
settlement, on which ordinary income tax and, when appropriate, 
penalty were paid. One-half of those who cashed out spent their 
distribution, about one-quarter saved or invested, and about one-
eighth paid off debt. About one-sixth of those who cashed out 
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reported “Other” as the use. If one assumes that “Other” indicates 
uses that effectively were spending, then 43.9 percent 
(33.62+10.24) of all recipients and 64.8 percent (43.9/67.6) of 
those who cashed out spent their distributions. 
However, to evaluate the long-term effect on retirement wealth, it 
is important to know the extent to which cash settlements are put 
to “wealth-preserving” uses. The obvious way to preserve wealth 
is through a rollover into another tax-qualified pension plan. 
However, this definition may be too narrow. For instance, 
workers may choose to pay taxes and penalties on a lump-sum 
distribution and invest in a non-pension asset (start a business, 
buy a house, etc.) or pay off debt. In these cases, cash settlements 
represent shifts in the composition of the respondent’s wealth 
portfolio, but they do not constitute changes in total wealth. 
These funds are preserved (albeit not in pensions) and potentially 
could provide for income or a higher standard of living in 
retirement. 
Naturally, there are a number of caveats that come with this 
definition of “wealth preservation.” First, it assumes that the 
assets purchased with pension funds will be a good store of value 
until retirement (e.g., purchase of a house) and that the debt that 
was paid off was incurred in the process of asset acquisition (e.g., 
paying down mortgage debt). But clearly, paying down credit 
card debt with pension money is not “wealth preserving.”4 
In the analysis that follows, it is not possible to determine 
whether dipping into pension money was the only difference 
between the two groups. Those who did (“spenders”) may have 
been fundamentally different from those who did not (“savers”) 
in ways that were not measured. For example, “savers” may have 
had better access to credit markets and may have borrowed to 
finance their big-ticket purchases, whereas “spenders” may have 
had poorer access to credit markets and, hence, used their pension 
money as recourse. The economic information in the HRS is the 
most detailed to date, but not detailed enough to account for such 
differences across households. 
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Panel B in Table 1 gives summary statistics by the type of 
rollover: tax-qualified and wealth preserving. Tax-qualified 
rollovers are distributions rolled to another tax-qualified plan, 
transferred to a new employer, or converted to an annuity. None 
triggers federal income tax or penalties. Wealth-preserving 
rollovers include tax-qualified rollovers as well as after-tax cash 
settlements that were reported saved or invested, or used to pay 
bills or debts. As column 1 shows, only 28 percent of all 
recipients had tax-qualified rollovers, but 51.7 percent had wealth 
preserving rollovers.  
Based on these figures, 23.7 percent of recipients used their after-
tax cash settlement to increase assets or reduce debts, and from 
panel A, it is clear that most was for asset accumulation. This is 
somewhat surprising, because these recipients were required to 
pay the penalty tax and income tax on their cash settlements.  
Column 2 shows the mean distribution by disposition. The 
median, in square brackets, is the value for the middle household, 
with one-half of the households in the sample above it and the 
other half below. All figures are in real 1992 dollars, deflated by 
the Consumer Price Index. In the bottom row in panel A, the 
mean and median distributions for all uses were $29,880 and 
$11,081, respectively. In comparison, the mean and median 
distributions for those recipients who rolled over to an IRA were 
significantly larger: $59,136 and $16,584, respectively. All after-
tax cash settlements had a mean and median of $17,753 and 
$8,920, respectively. Within this category, settlements that were 
saved or invested were much larger than those that were spent or 
used to pay bills or debts.  
Column 3 gives the percent of all distributions by type of 
disposition as a measure of incidence. These dollar-weighted 
frequencies cast a more favorable picture of the preservation of 
pension wealth upon job change. Larger distributions were more 
likely to have been saved. In panel B, 55 percent of all 
distributions were tax-qualified rollovers, and 71.8 percent were 
wealth-preserving rollovers. Therefore, even though only about 
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half of the recipients had wealth-preserving rollovers, almost 72 
percent of the pre-retirement distribution dollars were saved.  
Are “Spenders” Less Wealthy than “Savers”? 
One common finding of previous studies in this area is that 
individuals who save their pension assets differ at the time of job 
change from those who spend them. In particular, “spenders” 
tend to be younger, less educated, earn less, and have shorter job 
tenure and smaller pension accumulations. Unfortunately, the 
HRS did not ask retrospective questions about personal wealth at 
the time of job change, so we do not know if “spenders” were 
systematically less wealthy than “savers” at that time. However, 
the HRS did ask about personal wealth in 1992, so we can answer 
a related question: whether those who spent distributions in the 
past are currently less wealthy (i.e., in 1992) than those who 
saved their pension assets. 
Panel A of Table 2 shows the mean current wealth of households 
who ever spent a pension distribution versus those who saved all 
distributions. Medians are in square brackets.5 Surprisingly, 
spenders had more current pension wealth than savers: about 
$8,900 and $4,200 more at the mean and median, respectively. 
However, these differences were not statistically significant.6  
A unique feature of the HRS is that respondents were asked 
permission to link their survey responses to administrative 
earnings histories and benefits records from the Social Security 
Administration. This has allowed for the construction of Social 
Security wealth for each survey household.7 Spenders have about 
$12,000 and $7,000 less in Social Security wealth than savers at 
the mean and median, respectively. Both differences are 
statistically significant. However, when retirement resources are 
measured as the sum of current pension and Social Security 
wealth, there is no statistically significant difference between the 
groups.  
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TABLE 2. Mean and Median Wealth and Lifetime Earnings for Households that Spent 
versus Saved Lump-Sum Distributions (in 1992 dollars) 
(1) (2) 
All Households (n=1,282) 
Variable 
Spent Any 
Distributions 
(n=659) 
Saved All Distributions 
(n=623) 
A.  Measure of Wealth   
Non-Housing Wealth 
 Pension Wealth 
96,173 
[22,853] 
87,237 
[18,623] 
 IRA and Keogh Wealth 
17,341* 
[0]* 
47,770 
[12,000] 
 Pension, IRA, and Keogh Wealth 
113,604 
[42,114]* 
135,007 
[58,959] 
 Social Security Wealth 
143,544* 
[137,097]* 
155,415 
[161,011] 
 Pension and Social Security 
Wealth 
239,717 
[186,747] 
246,114 
[194,077] 
 Pension, IRA, Keogh and Social 
Security Wealth 
257,148* 
[200,339]* 
296,033 
[225,064] 
 Other Non-Housing Wealth 
156,511 
[41,000]* 
216,763 
[54,000] 
Housing Wealth 
63,647 
[50,000] 
78,855 
[57,000] 
Total Wealth 
477,306* 
[342,897]* 
605,570 
[405,817] 
B.  Measure of Lifetime Earnings   
Social Security Average Indexed 
     Monthly Earnings (AIME) 
2,345* 
[2,360]* 
2,577 
[2,650] 
Note:  Medians in square brackets. An asterisk indicates a statistical significant 
difference between the figures in columns (1) and (2) at the 5 percent level. All figures 
were calculated using the HRS household analysis weights. When weighted, the 
subgroup of 659 represented 1,556,433 aggregate households and the subgroup of 
623 represented 1,525,737 aggregate households. See glossary for definitions of 
terms.. 
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
The differences in mean and median non-housing wealth are 
large, about $60,000 and $13,000, respectively, and statistically 
significant. In contrast, the two groups look similar in terms of 
housing wealth. The differences in housing wealth are 
economically small. The last measure in panel A is total wealth, 
defined as the sum of Social Security, pension, non-housing, and 
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housing wealth. Overall, spenders are substantially less wealthy 
than savers. Even measured by the median, households that spent 
distributions have about $62,000 less in wealth than households 
that saved distributions. 
Panel B compares the lifetime earnings of the two groups 
measured by the Social Security Administration’s Average 
Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME, which equals the average of a 
person’s highest 35 years of income). Households that spent 
distributions had lower AIME by $232 and $290 per month, or 
$2,784 and $3,480 per year, at the mean and median, 
respectively. These differences are statistically significant and 
economically important.  
How Much More Would “Spenders” Have Available 
for Retirement?  
How much more in retirement resources would households that 
dipped into their pension assets have had had they instead saved 
that money? To quantify this, I define PVS, the household’s 
“present value of spent lump-sum distributions.” It is the amount 
of wealth that all spent lump-sum distributions would have grown 
to today had they been rolled over to a tax-qualified plan and 
invested rather than cashed out and spent.  The “present” is 1992. 
Specifically, for unmarried individuals in the sample, PVS was 
calculated as follows. First, for each past job with a spent 
distribution, the present investment value of that distribution was 
calculated. This required knowing the year and amount of the 
distribution (given in the HRS) and the periodic real rate of 
return. Based on historical returns in Ibbotson Associates (1997), 
annual real rates of return were calculated for three investment 
strategies: 100 percent investment in corporate bonds; 50 percent 
in corporate bonds and 50 percent in stocks; and, 100 percent in 
stocks. For married couples, PVS was calculated for the 
individual and spouse and then summed.  
Table 3 gives the distribution of PVS for the sub-sample of 659 
households in the 1992 HRS with a member who spent at least 
one pre-retirement lump-sum distribution. The figures in columns 
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1-3 reflect the three assumptions about the investment mix just 
outlined. The mean present value of spent lump-sum distributions 
was $37,002 if invested solely in bonds. With a higher risk-return 
investment strategy of 100 percent stocks, this increased to 
$54,643. Like other measures of wealth, PVS is right-skewed 
(because very wealthy people raise the mean) and the mean 
greatly exceeds the median. At the median, PVS was $17,065 and 
$23,167 if invested all in bonds and all in stocks, respectively.   
TABLE 3. The Present Value of Spent Lump-Sum Distributions and Pension Wealth, 1992 Dollars 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Present Value of Spent Lump-Sum Distributions 
(1992 dollars) 
Percentile 
100% 
Bonds 
50%/50% 
Bonds/Stocks 100% Stocks 
Current 
Pension 
Wealth 
Counterfactual 
Pension Wealth 
10th 2,583 2,994 2,994 0 7,746 
25th 5,714 7,042 7,874 0 22,924 
50th 17,065 21,125 23,167 22,853 77,921 
75th 42,857 49,339 56,824 119,247 173,009 
90th 79,692 100,923 120,748 290,063 350,588 
Mean 37,002 45,807 54,643 96,173 141,981 
Note:  All figures were calculated using the HRS household analysis weights. These statistics were 
calculated on the subsample of 659 HRS households that ever spent a lump-sum distribution. When 
weighted, this subsample represented 1,556,433 aggregate households. A total of 69 percent of these 
households had positive current pension wealth in 1992 and 31 percent had no current pension 
wealth. Counterfactual pension wealth in column (5) is the sum of actual pension wealth and the 
present value of spent lump-sum distributions assuming an investment mix of 5 percent bonds and 50 
percent stocks. It represents the pension wealth the household would have had had it not spent past 
distributions. See glossary for definitions of other terms. 
Column 4 gives the distribution of current pension wealth. Mean 
and median current pension wealth were $96,173 and $22,853, 
respectively. In addition, column 5 displays “counterfactual” 
pension wealth. This is sum of current pension wealth and the 
present value of spent distributions with an investment mix of 50 
percent bonds and stocks, respectively. It represents the pension 
wealth the household would have had currently had it not spent 
any past distributions and instead rolled them over. Mean and 
median counterfactual pension wealth were $141,981 and 
$77,921, respectively.8 Measured in absolute terms, it is clear that 
pension wealth would have been significantly higher for some 
households had distributions been rolled over. 
To determine whether these absolute amounts would have 
supplemented actual retirement resources significantly, they 
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should be compared to broader measures of household wealth. 
Therefore, the relative importance of erosion is measured as 
W
PVS , 
where the denominator, W, is a measure of the household’s 
retirement wealth. 
TABLE 4. The Present Value of Spent Lump-Sum Distributions as a Percentage of 
Broader Measures of Wealth 
(1) (2) (3) 
Percentile 100% Bonds 50/50 Bonds/Stocks 100% Stocks 
A.  As a Percentage of Social Security and Pension Wealth 
10th 1.16 1.27 1.37 
25th 2.87 3.53 3.80 
50th 8.13 9.73 11.17 
75th 23.73 27.25 32.06 
90th 58.91 65.30 74.50 
B.  As a Percentage of Social Security, Pension, and Non-Housing Wealth 
10th 0.69 0.81 0.97 
25th 1.91 2.28 2.54 
50th 5.36 6.42 7.27 
75th 14.91 17.94 20.47 
90th 37.72 44.29 50.72 
C.  As a Percentage of Total Wealth 
10th 0.63 0.71 0.79 
25th 1.62 1.93 2.17 
50th 4.52 5.24 6.43 
75th 12.53 14.99 17.06 
90th 28.64 35.38 41.15 
Note:  All figures are percentages and were calculated using the HRS household 
analysis weights. These statistics were calculated on the subsample of 659 HRS 
households that ever spent a lump-sum distribution. When weighted, this 
subsample represented 1,556,433 aggregate households. See glossary for 
definitions of terms. 
Table 4 compares PVS relative to three broader measures of 
household wealth. The first, in panel A, is the sum of current 
pension and Social Security wealth. Erosion is modest because 
spenders had significant Social Security wealth (as shown in 
Table 5). The median household could have increased its 
retirement wealth by 8 to 11 percent had it rolled over. However, 
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for a small fraction of households, having saved the distribution 
would have significantly increased resources for retirement. For 
example, 25 percent of the households would have had at least 
25 percent more in retirement wealth, and 10 percent of 
households would have had at least 59 percent more.  
Because households could have saved for retirement outside of 
public and private pensions, panel B uses the sum of Social 
Security, pension, and non-housing wealth as a measure of 
retirement wealth. Importantly, non-housing wealth includes IRA 
and Keogh wealth, which could be significant sources of 
retirement income. By this metric, spent distributions become 
less important. The median household with a spent distribution 
could have increased its retirement wealth by about 6 percent had 
it rolled over the distributions. One-quarter of the households 
would have had at least 15 percent more in retirement wealth, and 
one-tenth would have had at least 38 percent more. 
Finally, because, in principle, housing equity can provide 
resources for retirement, panel C uses total wealth (the sum of 
Social Security, pension, non-housing, and housing wealth) as a 
measure of retirement wealth. By this metric, spent distributions 
become even less important. The median household with a spent 
distribution could have increased its retirement wealth by about 
5 percent had it rolled over the distributions. One-quarter of the 
households would have had at least 12 percent more in retirement 
wealth, and one-tenth would have had at least 29 percent or more. 
Overall, Table 4 suggests consumed distributions did not result in 
significant erosion of retirement resources broadly measured for 
the great majority of households that spent their distributions. 
However, because of heterogeneity among those that spent 
distributions, there is a small group of households that could have 
raised their retirement resources substantially (those in the 75th 
percentile and higher in Table 4) had they rolled over. However, 
it should be emphasized that this subgroup represents only 
2.25 percent of all households between the ages of 51 and 61. 
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TABLE 5. The Present Value of Spent Lump-Sum Distributions as a Percentage of Wealth, by Race and 
Education 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Investment:  50% bonds, 50% Stocks 
Race Education 
Percentile White Nonwhite 
High 
School 
Dropout 
High 
School 
Diploma 
Some 
College 
Bachelor’s 
Degree 
More than 
College 
A.  As a Percentage of Social Security and Pension Wealth 
25th 3.54 3.63 2.68 2.56 3.55 4.48 6.97 
50th 9.73 9.87 6.60 8.91 9.49 12.45 20.20 
75th 26.47 33.76 15.32 23.95 29.06 36.11 32.47 
B.  As a Percentage of Social Security, Pension, and Non-Housing Wealth 
25th 2.18 2.64 2.06 1.94 2.27 2.66 3.48 
50th 6.21 8.13 5.30 6.21 6.61 5.32 10.32 
75th 17.74 22.46 13.60 16.16 20.85 18.76 21.48 
C.  As a Percentage of Total Wealth 
  
25th 1.88 2.21 1.86 1.76 1.96 2.36 2.71 
50th 5.19 7.30 4.78 5.19 5.42 4.75 9.80 
75th 14.41 20.38 11.03 12.96 17.23 16.77 18.25 
Note:  All figures are percentages and were calculated using the HRS household analysis weights. These 
statistics were calculated on the subsample of 659 HRS households that ever spent a lump-sum distribution. 
When weighted, this subsample represented 1,556,433 aggregate households. Race and education are that of 
the individual in the household who received the lump-sum distribution that was spent. If more than one 
member of the household ever spent a distribution, then the race and education are that of the individual 
designated the HRS primary respondent. See glossary for definitions of other terms.  
Table 5 repeats the tabulations in Table 4 by race and education 
categories for an investment mix of 50 percent bonds and stocks, 
respectively. Measured in terms of current pension and Social 
Security wealth (panel A), there was little difference in erosion 
by race. When wealth was measured more broadly, as in panels B 
and C, nonwhites had slightly greater erosion than whites. For 
example, in panel B, columns 1 and 2, the median white 
household with a spent distribution could have improved 
retirement resources (excluding housing) by 6.2 percent, whereas 
the median nonwhite household could have improved by 
8.1 percent.  
Erosion rose with educational attainment (columns 3-7). For 
example, in panel A, the median high-school-dropout household 
with a spent distribution could have improved retirement 
resources by 6.6 percent compared to 12.5 percent for the median 
bachelor’s-degree household, and 20.2 percent for the median 
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more than college household. Erosion was greatest for the most 
educated.  
Conclusion 
The primary finding is that overall there is little evidence that 
dipping into pension funds significantly decreases retirement 
wealth, because workers in the sample typically consumed 
pension distributions of relatively small value while they 
preserved large pension accumulations for retirement. If pension 
assets that were spent instead had been preserved for retirement, 
they would have represented about 10 percent of retirement 
wealth for the typical household that spent the money. However, 
there is a small group of households that would have benefited 
greatly if they had not dipped into their pensions. About 2 percent 
of all respondents between the ages of 51 and 61 in 1992 could 
have increased their household retirement wealth by at least 
25 percent had they not dipped into their pensions. This suggests 
that proposed policy mechanisms that would enforce pension 
rollovers may not raise the retirement income security of the 
average American household, but could provide some protection 
for a limited number of households. 
There is an important caveat to these findings. This study was 
based on a national sample of individuals 51 to 61 years old in 
1992. These data have significant advantages over those used in 
previous studies. However, resulting policy statements are most 
accurately applied to individuals and households of roughly the 
same age. If younger individuals have different attitudes toward 
saving, view pension assets as less dedicated toward retirement, 
or have greater access to funds, then this analysis may 
underestimate the erosion to retirement income security for 
younger workers.9 
This policy brief briefly describes what I believe to be a crucial 
step in formulating a model of the long-run implications of lump-
sum distributions on the adequacy of retirement income benefits. 
Such a model should be the ultimate goal of this line of research. 
Gary V. Engelhardt 
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1. A complete, detailed analysis can be found in Engelhardt 
(2001). 
2.  “A household’s economic well-being depends on both its 
income and its asset accumulation, often referred to as its wealth. 
While income is the flow of resources to a household, wealth is 
the level of resources at any point in time. Wealth, also called net 
worth, is a particularly important dimension of well-being for 
some subgroups of the population such as the elderly, who tend 
to have lower retirement incomes but higher asset holdings” 
(Eller and Fraser 1995, p. 1). 
3. Under current law, plans may automatically distribute the 
account balance of any employee who terminates with a 
retirement plan balance of $5,000 or less. Such forced 
distributions may generally be rolled over and the plan 
administrator must provide a written notice of this and the related 
tax consequences before making the distribution. The new law 
[the Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001 (P.L. 
107-16), recently signed by President Bush] requires that for 
forced distributions greater than $1,000, a direct rollover to an 
IRA designated by the current plan administrator will be made, 
unless the participant affirmatively elects otherwise. This will go 
into effect as soon as the Department of Labor issues final 
regulations interpreting the automatic rollover provision, and the 
DOL must issue such regulations within three years (TIAA-
CREF 2001). This appears to be an effort to reduce consumption 
of small lump-sum distributions. 
4.  This is especially the case for any borrowing done in 
anticipation of getting access to pension money. If an individual 
took a vacation after leaving a job and paid for it from pension 
 
Endnotes 
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money, then that money is considered spent under the definition 
above. However, if the same individual borrowed (say, on a 
credit card) to pay for the vacation in anticipation of access to the 
pension money, and then subsequently used the pension money to 
pay off the credit card debt, then the money is considered 
preserved under the above definition. Both scenarios have the 
same economic consequences, but are measured differently. 
Unfortunately, the questions asked in the HRS were not detailed 
enough to separate out these two different scenarios. 
5. Technically, pension wealth is defined in Table 2 as the 
present value (in 1992) of the household’s claims to assets in 
defined benefit and defined contribution plans and the present 
value of any annuitized pensions. It does not include the value of 
any lump-sum distributions that were rolled into an IRA. It was 
calculated by Venti and Wise (2000). 
6. Technically, statistical significance is defined at the 
5 percent level here. 
7. Technically, the measure used came from two sources. For 
individuals with matched Social Security earnings histories, 
Social Security wealth came from the restricted access Earnings 
and Benefits File (EBF) for the 1992 HRS (Wave 1) from the 
Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. The 
calculation of Social Security wealth in the EBF is described in 
Mitchell, Olson, and Steinmeier (1996). For individuals without 
matched Social Security earnings histories, Social Security 
wealth was imputed using self-reported information on earnings 
histories in the 1992 and 1996 HRS (Waves 1 and 3) following 
the method in Gustman and Steinmeier (1999). 
8. The means in columns 2 and 4 sum to that in column 5. But 
because the median of a sum is not necessarily the sum of the 
medians, the median in column 5 is not the sum of the medians in 
columns 2 and 4; this is true for the other percentiles shown as 
well. 
 
Gary V. Engelhardt 
19 
 
9.  For example, when offered a 401(k) plan, younger workers 
are far less likely to participate than older workers. This has led 
to a decrease in overall pension coverage among younger 
workers. For fulltime workers under age 25, the pension coverage 
rate decreased from 31 percent in 1972 to 21 percent in 1993. 
Among workers age 55 to 59 the coverage rate increased from 
53 percent in 1972 to 59 percent in 1993 (US DOL 1999). 
 
Glossary 
Annuity: A contract by which an insurance company agrees to make regular 
payments to someone for life or for a fixed period. Fixed Annuity: A 
traditional insurance investment vehicle, often used for retirement accounts, 
that guarantees principal and a specified interest rate and may also offer 
dividends. Variable Annuity: An annuity, the value of which fluctuates based 
on the market performance of an underlying securities portfolio. Unlike fixed 
annuities, there is no guarantee of principal or rate of return. 
Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME): The average of an 
individual’s 35 highest yearly earnings—used in calculating the monthly 
benefit at Social Security’s full retirement age. 
Defined Benefit Plan: In a defined benefit plan, each employee's future 
benefit is determined by a specific formula, and the plan provides a guaranteed 
level of benefits on retirement. A private defined benefit plan is typically not 
contributory—there are usually no employee contributions, no individual 
accounts are maintained for each employee. The employer makes regular 
contributions to the entire plan to fund the future benefits of the entire cohort 
of participants. The employer bears the risk associated with providing the 
guaranteed level of retirement benefits. Usually, the promised benefit is tied to 
the employee's earnings, length of service, or both. (This and several other 
definitions in this glossary are from The American Savings Education Council 
Web site <http://www.asec.org/terms.htm>. ASEC is part of the Employee 
Benefit Research Institute Education and Research Fund, a 501(c)(3) non-
profit charitable organization.) 
Defined Contribution Plan: In a defined contribution plan, employers 
generally promise to make annual or periodic contributions to accounts that 
are set up for each employee. Sometimes there are only employer 
contributions, sometimes only employee contributions, and sometimes both. 
The current contribution is guaranteed but the level of benefits at retirement is 
not. The benefit payable at retirement is based on money accumulated in each 
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employee's account. The final retirement amount reflects the total of employer 
contributions, any employee contributions, and investment gains or losses.  
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA): ERISA 
was designed to secure the benefits of participants in private pension plans 
through participation, vesting, funding, reporting, and disclosure rules and the 
creation of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. ERISA provided added 
pension incentives for the self-employed through changes in Keoghs and for 
persons not covered by pensions through individual retirement accounts 
(IRAs). It established requirements for plan implementation and operation. 
401(k) Plan: A cash or deferred arrangement (CODA) that lets an employee 
contribute pretax dollars to a company investment vehicle until the employee 
retires or leaves the company.  
403(b) Plan: Similar to a 401(k), a cash or deferred arrangement (CODA) 
that lets an employee of a tax-exempt education or research organization or 
public school contribute pretax dollars to an investment pool until the 
employee retires or terminates employment.  
Individual Retirement Account (IRA): An IRA provides individuals an 
opportunity to save for retirement on a tax-deferred basis. Individuals may 
contribute up to $2,000 per year in an individual account; for spousal accounts 
the limits are $4,000 if both spouses work and $2,250 if one spouse works. 
The amount that is tax deductible varies according to an individual's pension 
coverage, income tax filing status, and adjusted gross income. Account 
balances distributed from one IRA or from a qualified retirement plan may be 
rolled over to another IRA. 
Keogh Plan: A Keogh plan is a qualified retirement plan for self-employed 
individuals and their employees to which tax-deductible contributions up to a 
specified yearly limit can be made if the plan meets certain requirements of the 
Internal Revenue Code. Keogh plans, also called H.R. 10 plans, may be 
defined benefit or defined contribution plans.  
Lump-Sum Distribution: Under a qualified retirement plan, the distribution 
of a participant's entire account balance (under a defined contribution plan) or 
of the entire value of a participant's accrued benefit (under a defined benefit 
plan) as a single cash payment to the participant (or, under certain 
circumstances, to another designated party). The availability and payment of 
lump-sum distributions are subject to certain legal restrictions, and premature 
receipt of such distributions can have adverse tax consequences. The term 
present value of spent lump-sum distributions as used in this Policy Brief is 
described in the text and uses historical returns from Ibbotson Associates 
(1997). 
Pension: A series of periodic payments, usually for life, payable monthly or 
at other specified intervals. The term is frequently used to describe the part of 
a retirement allowance financed by employer contributions. A pension plan is 
a plan that provides benefits, after retirement, from a trust or other separately 
Gary V. Engelhardt 
21 
maintained fund, by the purchase of insurance, or from general assets 
(unfunded plan). The amount of benefits is either specified or can be 
calculated in accordance with a set formula based on various factors such as 
age, earnings and service, but not profits. The amount of annual contributions 
needed to provide the specified benefits can be estimated actuarially and does 
not depend upon profits (IFEBP 2000). Pension wealth is the household’s 
present value of claims to pension assets in 1992, based on self-reported 
pension data, and is taken from Venti and Wise (2000).  
Rollover: An employee's transfer of retirement funds from one retirement 
plan to another plan of the same type or to an IRA without incurring a tax 
liability. The transfer must be made within 60 days of receiving a cash 
distribution. The law requires 20 percent federal income tax withholding on 
money eligible for rollover if it is not moved directly to the second plan or an 
investment company.  
Salary Reduction Plan (Cash or Deferred Arrangement (CODA)): A 
CODA is a defined contribution plan that allows participants to have a portion 
of their compensation (otherwise payable in cash) contributed pre-tax to a 
retirement account on their behalf. The following are types of CODA plans 
named after the section of the Internal Revenue Code that establishes the rules 
for the plan. 401(k) - CODA plan for the for-profit sector of private industry. 
403(b) - CODA plan for the not-for-profit sector of private industry. 457 - 
CODA plan for state and local governments. 
Savings or Thrift Plan: A defined contribution plan in which participants 
make contributions on a discretionary basis with limits and to which 
employers may also contribute, usually on the basis of fully or partially 
matching participants' contributions. Contributions are commonly made with 
after-tax earnings. 
Tax Deferral: Postponing taxes due on an amount invested and/or its 
earnings until they are withdrawn from the investment. 
Tax Qualified Plan: Often used to refer to plans established under sections 
401(k), 401(a), or 403(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. More commonly, any 
retirement plan that meets IRS criteria that allow employers to deduct pension 
costs as a business expense and defer current income tax on its earnings and 
allow employees to defer income tax on the employer's contributions and 
earnings. 
Wealth: All goods and resources having value in terms of exchange or use 
(American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 3rd edition). Several 
categories of wealth are used in this Policy Brief. Pension wealth is the 
household’s present value of claims to pension assets in 1992, based on self-
reported pension data, and is taken from Venti and Wise (2000). Other non-
housing wealth includes non-pension, non-housing wealth in forms other than 
IRAs and Keoghs. Social Security wealth is the household’s expected present 
value of claims to Social Security in 1992 and is taken from the HRS Social 
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Security Earnings and Benefits File and from Gustman and Steinmeier (1998) 
as described in the text. Total wealth is the sum of pension, Social Security, 
IRA, Keogh, other non-housing, and housing wealth. 
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